






Empirical evidence of the 
Gordon’s growth model 















Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the International 
MSc in Management at Universidade Católica Portuguesa and the MSc in 




Empirical evidence of the Gordon’s growth model 
accuracy on US stocks’ valuation 
Alfredo Resende 
 
Abstract   
Research findings suggest that the Gordon’s growth model is not an accurate tool to value US 
companies in the twenty-first century (regardless of the economic cycle) and, its growing 
underestimation tendency throughout the analyzed period (2002-2018), may lead investors to 
engage in wrong investment decisions. 
Both company’s dividend payout ratio and share repurchase activities were not considered 
statistically significant to explain the observed difference in prices, in contrary to the company’s 
dividend yield ratio, profitability level and some GIC sectors (information technology, 
consumer discretionary and utility) that proved to be significant. However, neither of these 
variables were able to control Gordon’s growth model lack of accuracy. Dividend yield and 
profitability variables did not denote a particular range that ensures a superior accuracy of the 
model results (overpricing outcome closer to 0%) and, accurate overpricing results across 
different GIC Sectors were always a minority, although it is possible to identify specific sectors 
with a higher underestimation propensity (information technology and consumer discretionary) 
and others with a higher overestimation propensity (utility and real estate).   
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Abstrato   
Os resultados desta pesquisa sugerem que o modelo de crescimnento de Gordon não é um 
mecanismo preciso para avaliar empresas americanas no século XXI e, a sua crescente 
propensão para subvalorizar empresas no período analizado (2002-2018), pode levar 
investidores a tomarem decisões de investimento erradas. 
Tanto o rácio de pagamento de dividendos, como a atividade de recompra de ações da empresa 
não foram considerados estatisticamente significantes para explicar a diferença de preços 
evidenciada, ao contrário da taxa de rendimento do dividendo (DPS/P), rentabilidade da 
empresa e alguns setor GIC (tecnologias de informação, bens de luxo e serviços públicos), que 
provaram ser significativos. No entanto, nenhuma dessas variáveis foi capaz de controlar a falta 
de precisão do modelo de crescimnento de Gordon. A taxa de rendimento do dividendo (DPS/P) 
e a rentabilidade da empresa não verificaram um intervalo específico que garanta uma maior 
precisão dos resultados do modelo e, resultados “overpricing” precisos foram sempre uma 
minoria em diferentes setores GIC, apesar de ser possível identificar setores com uma maior 
propensão para estarem subvalorizados (tecnologias de informação e bens de luxo) e outros 
com uma maior propensão para estarem sobrevalorizados (serviços públicos e imobiliário). 
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1. Introduction  
Since the 20th century, several valuation models were designed to support investors on their 
investment decisions. One of the oldest and most known models is the Gordon’s growth model 
(Gordon and Shapiro, 1956; Gordon, 1962), which values a stock by discounting shareholders’ 
future dividend cash flows, at a rate Ke, while assuming a perpetual and constant growth of 
those dividends payments (g). 
𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 =  
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑘𝑒 − 𝑔
 
Although several researchers have studied the impact of dividend payments on the market stock 
price (Modigliani and Miller, 1961; Lintner, 1962; Shiller, 1981), there is no empirical evidence 
of the Gordon’s growth model (GGM) accuracy among US stocks.  
This paper aims to test that relationship by valuing US stocks traded on the NYSE, Amex and 
Nasdaq, and compare it with the observed market stock price on the same period. The variable 








This variable, measures Gordon’s growth model accuracy on predicting US companies market 
stock price: “How much higher is the GGM price, when comparing to the corresponding 
company’s market stock price”. A positive overpricing is called “overestimation”, whereas a 
negative overpricing corresponds to a model “underestimation”. The closer the overpricing is 
to zero, the more accurate will be the model estimation.  
Gordon considers, in his model, dividends as the only cash flow stream that a company returns 
to its equity holders. This was probably a reasonable statement in 1962 (when the model was 
created), because firms were not relying on additional ways to return cash to shareholders 
(Fama and French, 2001; Skinner, 2008). But, is it really the case nowadays? Fama and French 
(2001) showed that since 1978, dividend payments started to decrease, and in 1999, there were 
only 20.8% of US companies distributing dividends. While Skinner (2008) presented an 
evolving relation between dividend payments and stock repurchase activities, initiated in 1980.  
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Given the high dependency of the Gordon’s growth model on future dividend cash flows, it 
would be important to investigate if, under these circumstances, the model can still be 
considered as a valid valuation technique for the US market. Consequently, the GGM 
effectiveness in valuing US stocks, will be tested by measuring the amplitude of the overpricing 
variable throughout a 17-year period horizon (from 2002 to 2018). 
Subsequentially, it is essential to assess if the model works better for some type of firms than 
others, meaning, the reliability of the model across stocks. Accordingly, this paper explores the 
impact that seven meticulously selected variables (based on past theoretical studies and 
furthered explained on the methodology section) have on the overpricing variable, through a 
multiple linear regression analysis. 
If this research identifies a specific pattern among companies where the overpricing is relatively 
small, the Gordon’s growth model could be further perceived as a more accurate valuation 
technique for those particular US stocks. In addition, since the GGM is a comparatively easier 
model to be applied, this study can represent an incremental contribution for all investors 
aiming to save time and money, that is much often lost when working with more complex 
valuation models.  
Conversely, if the Gordon’s growth model does not appear to be appropriate to value a certain 
type of US stocks, then it might be considered of questionable use for future valuation practices 
on those cases. 
2. Literature review  
2.1 Dividend impact on firm valuation 
When analyzing the impact that dividend payments have on the valuation of a given stock, one 
can argue that there is no consensus regarding past literature. Modigliani and Miller (1961) 
claim that, in an “efficient and perfect market”, there should be no difference in the value of a 
firm that pays dividends and another that does not rely on any dividend payment. According to 
the authors, shareholders should be indifferent towards dividend payments, since the share price 
would be solely connected with the overall earnings generation capability of the company. 
Additionally, the authors stated that, there are enough investors with different dividend 
preferences, and that is the reason why they assume companies to be fairly valued, regardless 
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of their dividend policies (clientele effect theory). This argument assumes that there are enough 
investors for every dividend segment. Thus, a firm that pays low dividends (or does not pay at 
all) should not be penalized for doing so, because its investors do not value dividends. 
Conversely, a firm that pays high dividends should not be overvalued simply because its 
investors like dividend payments. Later, Higgins (1972) strengthen M&M position, arguing that 
investors can create “home-made dividends” by buying additional stock, if dividend payments 
are over investor’s expectations, or by selling stock if the dividend stream is considered to be 
below the desired levels. In other words, investors are able to replicate their own “optimal cash 
flow stream”. 
Yet, in the meantime, several studies were built to prove dividend impact on stock valuation, 
arguing that, under imperfect market conditions (as the ones we live in), the assumptions 
outlined by M&M do not hold. Lintner (1962) and Gordon (1963) were the first to claim that 
investors have a preference for dividends instead of capital gains. Both authors argue that, due 
to investors’ general risk aversion, they prefer a certain dividend payment today than having to 
wait for a possible capital gain somewhere in the future. Meaning, investors prefer to have an 
expectable and constant stream of cash throughout the periods (dividends), than to wait for a 
potentially higher cash stream (capital gains) that is highly dependent on the company’s 
management decisions (bird-in-hand theory). Jensen and Meckling (1976) corroborates 
Gordon’s and Lintner’s view on dividends preferences, by refuting M&M proposition that 
assumes managers as perfect agents aiming to maximize shareholders’ value. According to 
them, there are possible conflicts of interest between a firm’s managers and its shareholders 
(agency costs), arriving from the firsts’ decisions. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
managers do not always act on behalf of shareholders, because of a potential misalignment 
between the firm’s control and ownership incentives.  
Moreover, Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) studies 
discovered that investors perceived the firm’s dividend policy as a signaling of its earnings 
prospects. According to the authors, the firm’s management team is perceived as an insider and 
accordingly, investors believe they possess more reliable information on the firm’s future 
prospects than themselves. By being aware of such information asymmetry, investors trust that 
high dividend payments or high dividend growths reflect managers’ positive prospects on the 
future activities of the firm, and vice versa. Subsequently, several authors focused their studies 
on trying to empirically prove this relation between dividend payments and stock price. Shiller 
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(1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) are two examples of those studies that investigated how 
changes in dividend payments or policies, might explain observed changes in the asset prices. 
2.2 Different approaches to the dividend discount model  
According to Damodaran (2007), there are four existing methods to perform a valuation. The 
first, discounted cash flow (DCF), values an asset by discounting future cash flows to the 
present value. The second, relative valuation, consists in valuing an asset through relative 
comparison with another firm’s variable such as sales, book values, earnings or cash flows. The 
third one, contingent claim valuation, utilizes option pricing models to assess the value of assets 
with similar option characteristics. The final method, accounting valuation, access the value of 
an asset through accounting estimates of book value. 
When performing a valuation through the DCF method, stocks can either be valued by the 
firm’s expected profitability (earnings or cash flows) or through the expected distribution of 
those profits to shareholders (dividends), (Hurley and Johnson, 1994). Williams (1938) settled 
the dividend discount model (DDM), a first application of the DCF method used to discount 
future dividend payments. According to the author, the intrinsic value of a stock should equal 
the future dividend payments to its equity holders.  
After this initial approach, several deviations were designed in order to simplify the model and 
make it more practical. Gordon (1962) designed a one-stage model, where he assumes a single 
perpetual and constant growth rate to discount all future dividend payments. The Gordon’s 
growth model (GGM) is seen as a simplistic adaptation of the DDM that, according to Bulan 
and Subramanian (2009), deliver better results for more matured firms that continuously rely 
on dividend payments as a way of distributing cash to its equity holders. Damodaran (1999) 
proposes the two-stage DDM alternative, where future dividend payments are divided into two 
different subset-groups, given their growth pace. A first stage/period where dividends are 
assumed to grow at a higher rate until it achieves a “steady growth stage”, and a subsequent 
phase where dividends grow at a lower stabilized rate, in perpetuity.  
Similarly, to the two-stage model, Cornell (1999) suggests a three-stage version of the DDM, 
where the author includes a transition period, in which the growth rate declines linearly to a 
lower, stable growth, which is then maintained forever. Both the two and three stage-models 
allow for a better control of the time variable. Not all firms have already achieved a steady 
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growth stage of their life cycle, and according to Mueller (1972), this is a crucial subject to 
determine the optimal dividend policy of a company. 
2.3 Previous applications of the Gordon’s growth model  
The Gordon’s growth model accuracy on predicting stock prices have been tested throughout 
the years for a number of stock exchanges, some specific sectors/industries, or for a given listed 
company. Sapp and Foerster (2005) compared the market stock price of a single firm, the Bank 
of Montreal, with the stock price computed thorough some of the most known DCF techniques, 
the DDM and GGM (based on dividend cash flows), as well as a Fed model (based on stocks’ 
earnings). The authors found that the accuracy of both DDM and GGM was consistently 
superior to the Fed’s model, when predicting the Bank of Montreal market stock price for a 
119-year range period (1885-2003). Despite several fluctuations of the GGM overpricing across 
the analyzed period, Sapp and Foerster (2005) results show a “reasonable” performance of the 
Gordon’s growth model, when compared to other valuation models that were also studied. 
Bujang and Nassir (2007) tested the Gordon’s growth model accuracy across some selected 
stocks from the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange. The authors described the model as a relevant 
valuation tool for the Malaysian stock market, that could yet be dependent on the country’s 
economic cycle in order to achieve more accurate predictions. 
Conversely, researches conducted on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (Olweny and Shipho, 2011; 
Aduda and Kimathi, 2011) reveal a lack of efficiency of the Gordon’s growth model on 
predicting the market stock price of those firms. Olweny and Shipho (2011) studies concluded 
that the GGM was not a reliable valuation technique for neither of the eighteen analyzed 
common stocks of the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Whereas, Aduda and Kimathi (2011) 
determined a non-existent relationship between the market stock price and the GGM stock price 
for a sample of eighteen companies traded on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Throughout the 7-
year period analyzed (2002-2008), overpricing results were extremely diverse, and no 
relationship was verified between the dividend per share amounts and the collected market 
stock price, on those years.  
Gordon’s growth model accuracy was also tested on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Acheampong 
and Agalega (2013) observed a considerable difference between the actual market stock price 
and the GGM stock price from the selected companies of the Ghana Stock Exchange. For the 
five years analyzed (2006-2010), there was an underestimation tendency of the Gordon’s 
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growth model stock price. Only in 2010, the result observed was different, with the GGM price 
surpassing the corresponding market stock price. The model was also tested on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE). Charumati and Suraj (2014) studied the accuracy of several valuation 
methods on a selected sample of 14 banks that constituted the BSE Bankex index. Results 
showed that the GGM model should not be relied on by investors, when trying to predict the 
real value of BSE’s banks, due to market inefficiencies, information differentials and 
measurement problems that were found. 
Ivanovski, Ivanovska and Narasanov (2015) studied the accuracy of the GGM, between 2006 
and 2011, for two specific industries (Banking and Pharmaceutical) of the Macedonian Stock 
Exchange (MSE). The authors characterized the GGM as a reliable valuation model for the 
MSE’s banks. According to them, the computed price was considerably close to the 
corresponding market stock price in every occasion, except for the period of the MSE’s “boom”. 
On the contrary, the model was not accurate on estimating the market stock price of 
pharmaceutical companies. Significant deviations between the market stock price and the GGM 
price were observed, with an extensive underestimation tendency of the GGM predictions.  
Even though the GGM accuracy was tested for several markets, there is no empirical evidence 
of the Gordon’s growth model (GGM) accuracy among US stocks. This research aims to test 
that same relationship but for a bigger market (US stock market), with a larger and broader 
stocks’ sample.  
2.4 The rising of alternative ways to distribute cash to shareholders  
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, several economists started to be concern about the 
possible “disappearing of dividend payments” as a way of distributing cash to the company’s 
shareholders (Fama and French, 2001).  
Skinner study (2008) proved that share repurchases is already “the dominant form of payout” 
for equity holders. The author shows that companies who merely rely on dividend payments, 
as a way of returning cash to shareholders, are mostly extinct, and firms which often rely on 
both dividend and buyback payments, are shifting towards the second form of payment. 
Explanations for this rise in repurchases have included: tax efficiency (Farrar and Selwyn, 1967; 
Brennan, 1971), flexibility (Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 
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2000), lack of dividend protection on executive options (Fenn and Liang, 2001), and funding 
of employee stock option exercises (Kahle, 2002). 
Recent studies show that times are changing and, in the meantime, the media and politicians 
are exposing their concerns on the magnitude of corporate payouts, driven by substantial 
increases of stock repurchases. Senator Marco Rubio complained that “Wall Street promotes 
stock buybacks, temporarily increasing the companies’ stock prices at the expense of prolific 
investments” and recommends taxing share repurchases (CNN Business, 2019). Senators 
Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders corroborates Rubio’s complains and suggest a quantified 
restriction on stock repurchases, since they see repurchases as a form of “corporate self-
indulgence”. According to both Senators, “Rather than investing in ways to make their 
businesses more resilient or their workers more productive, companies have been dedicating 
ever-larger shares of their profits to dividends and corporate share repurchases.” (The New 
York Times, 2019). Also, academics expressed their concerns on how this mentioned growth 
of repurchases has contributed to a decrease in capital expenditures among firms (Almeida, Fos, 
and Kronlund, 2016; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2017). 
While repurchases have indeed snowballed over the past decades, several authors have pointed 
an increasing impact of mergers and acquisitions activities as an additional way of distributing 
cash to shareholders (Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Ackert and Smith, 1993; Mehra, 1998). The 
authors claim that, after an M&A activity, the share value of the acquiring firm tend to capitalize 
the new investment with a consequential increase in its stock valuation, offering existing 
shareholders the possibility to cash-out their initial investment and generate a subsequent return 
flow.  
Given the rising of these alternative cash flow streams to equity holders, it would be interesting 
and also recommendable, to test the validity of the Gordon’s growth model in a more recent 
period, and that is the main proposition of this empirical research. Despite being a valuation 
model extremely dependent on dividend flows to shareholders, the GGM is still being used by 
analysts and investors worldwide, as a tool for correctly valuing a stock, and consequentially 
engage in investment decisions. However, recent studies have suggested that this may no longer 
be the case.  
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3. Data and methodology 
The data and methodology section are divided into two parts. The first part will describe the 
procedures and rationale used to develop the variables needed for the determination of the 
Gordon’s growth model stock price (𝑃𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) and consequentially, the overpricing variable. 
Whereas, on the second part, it will be explained the rationale behind all independent variables 
of the multiple linear regression (MLR) used to explain the observed differences in prices. 
3.1 GGM stock price and overpricing computation 
The research study was narrowed to US common stocks included on the CRSP/Compustat 
annual database, that were traded on the NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq (Stock exchange codes: 11, 
12 and 14 respectively), from the year 2002 to 2018 (17-year period horizon). Furthermore, 
only stocks traded in US dollars were considered for research purposes, excluding stocks that 
were traded in Canadian dollars in order to avoid possible effects of currencies’ 
appreciation/depreciation over time. All data collected and variables needed for the 
computation of the annual GGM stock price and the annual market stock price, will be further 
explained.  
For the GGM stock price computation, three different variables had to be considered: the actual 
dividend per share, the forecasted growth rate, and the cost of equity used to discount the cash 
flows. 
𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 =  
𝐷𝑃𝑆 𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑘𝑒 − 𝑔
 
The annual dividend per share variable (DPS) extracted from CRSP/Compustat Merged 
database is expressed in US dollars amounts, and corresponds to the total dividend amount 
received by a company’s equity holder, on a specific year. So, a shareholder that possesses one 
share of the company, would be entitled to receive the mentioned dividend payment (DPS). 
Given the unquestionable dependence of the Gordon’s growth model on the initial DPS 
payment (𝐷𝑃𝑆0), in order to calculate the corresponding stock price at the same point in time 
(t), all stocks that displayed incompatible data with the model proposed were discharged. 
Meaning, firms that presented missing values of the DPS (blank DPS cells), or did not engage 
in any dividend payment (DPS = 0), were excluded from the final sample of that specific period. 
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Nevertheless, a company that was not considered for test on a given period because any DPS 
payment was observed, can still be considered for the following periods, if the above condition 
is met. Consequentially, the yearly sample will end up being different throughout the 17-year 
period, due to these initial criteria set. 
As for the growth rate variable (g), IBES annual database was used to extract analysts’ forecast 
on future DPS payments, and the correspondence with the actual DPS values were ensured 
through the exchange ticker symbol, first 6-digit CUSIP number and year variables’ matches. 
Analysts’ forecasts were then utilized to calculate the expected growth rate for each identified 
period (t).  
𝑔𝑡 =  
𝐷𝑃𝑆 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡
 
Such method is also used by other researchers (Sorensen & Williamson, 1985), bracing the 
assumption that, analysts’ forecasts on future DPS payments, are perceived as a good proxy of 
investors’ future expectations on those respective cash flows. Accordingly, if the actual yearly 
cash flow is expected to increase on the subsequent period (t+1), investors will tend to adapt 
their stock valuation according to it, and the stock price will most likely rise over that period 
(t), and vice versa. 
Finally, the cost of equity (𝑘𝑒) was driven from the very well-known CAPM model. According 
to Damodaran (2012), the CAPM model has been recognized as a standard and reliable 
technique for cost of equity calculations. The CAPM determines the risk level of a specific 
company considering its sensitivity to the stock market. It does so by taking into account the 
risk-free rate (𝑟𝑓); the market risk premium (𝑀𝑅𝑃), that represents the difference between the 
return of the market and the risk-free investment return; and the risk of a particular company 
when compared to the average company’s risk (𝐵𝑖). 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀:  𝐾𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐵 ∗ (𝑀𝑅𝑃) 
In order to obtain the annual rf value, the monthly rates extracted from the Kenneth French data 
library corresponding to the one-month Treasury bill rate, were annualized. As for the yearly 
company Beta, it was considered the value observed on the last trading day of each year, that 
was obtained from the Beta Suite WRDS database, following a 252 trading days estimation 
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window. Lastly, the market risk premium corresponds to the implied annual MRP for the US 
equity market, that was drawn from the Damodaran’s annual database. 
Additionally, in order to ensure the applicability of the model, it was imperative to certify that 
the cost of equity was higher than the growth rate (ke > g), for every period being analyzed.  
After meeting these required criteria, it was possible to attain a final sample with 3,572 different 
observations. 
Regarding the market stock price variable, the annual closing price from the CRSP/Compustat 
Merged database was adjusted for stock splits (price adjustment factor) and considered to be 
the  𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡.  Meaning, the annual market stock price (𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) utilized, corresponds to the 
result drove from the ratio between the annual Price variable (P) and the corresponding 
Cumulative Factor to Adjust Price (CFAP).  
The overpricing variable was subsequentially computed by dividing the difference in two prices 
(𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) and the market stock price (𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡). Consequently, the values will be 







Finally, in order to exclude some extreme values that could be distorting the final results, 
overpricing values were winsorized at 1 (left side) and 99 (right side) percentile levels. This is 
considered to be a standard procedure which ensures that, further analyzed results, will not be 
biased by spurious outliers. Furthermore, results will be divided into three different time frames: 
the period before the subprime crisis (2002-2006), the crisis period (2007-2010) and the period 
after (2011-2018). The time frame was determined according to US GDP annual growth rates. 
The crisis horizon (2007-2010) corresponds to 2008 and 2009, where the US GDP annual 
growth rate revealed negative values (-0.137% and -2.537% respectively) typical from a 
recession period, plus one year before (2007) and one year after (2010) the described horizon, 
in order to capture both leading and lagging crisis’ effects. Those figures (Annual % GDP 
growth – US) were extracted from the World Bank national accounts data, and corroborated 
through the OECD national accounts data files. 
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The objective is to analyze possible differences on the performance of the model being tested, 
that were driven by the subprime crisis, as well as to safeguard that precedent and subsequent 
results were not being distorted by results observed during the crisis. 
3.2 Multiple linear regression variables - selection process  
For the multiple regression test, the initial sample size of 3,572 observations was reduced by 
70 units summing a total of 3,502 observations, due to the non-existence of values from 26 
different companies on the CRSP/Compustat Merged database. Additionally, as mentioned 
before, the final sample will only include US common stocks traded on the NYSE, Amex and 
Nasdaq (Stock exchange codes: 11, 12 and 14 respectively) in US dollars amounts, from the 
year 2002 to 2018 (17-year period horizon). 
The primary purpose of the regression is to identify any specific pattern regarding: stock 
characteristics, dividend payments, industry in which it operates, and others, that could better 
explain the price deviation that was observed through the overpricing variable. It would 
certainly be important to understand if the model works better for some type of firms than 
others. Consequentially, the second part of the study will explore the impact that several 
selected variables (based on past literature) have on the observed overpricing (dependent 
variable), through the analysis of a multiple linear regression (MLR).  
Seven independent variables were developed and divided into four control variables: Log 
(Sales), Debt/Assets, Net Income/Sales and Stock’s Industry, plus three explanatory variables: 
DPS/EPS (dividend payout ratio), DPS/P (dividend yield) and Share Repurchases.  






+ 𝐵4 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝐵5
∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝐵6 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝐵7 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡. +𝐵8 ∗ 𝐶. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐵9
∗ 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝐵10 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝐵11 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓. 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ. +𝐵12 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚. 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝐵13
∗ 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐵14 ∗
𝐷𝑃𝑆
𝐸𝑃𝑆
+  𝐵15 ∗
𝐷𝑃𝑆
𝑃
+ 𝐵16 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 
A correlation matrix was built in order to guarantee the non-existence of multicollinearity 
relationships within independent variables, as well as between independent variables and the 
dependent one. No multicollinearity was verified (Evidence on Appendix C.1), and the highest 




Log (Sales): This item represents gross sales, reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and 
returned sales. The logarithmic scale was applied due to the high variation of the Sales values, 
and will enable a clearer analysis of the selected variable. Other researchers commonly use the 
Log (Sales) as an appropriate control variable of the firms’ size. According to Dang, Li, and 
Yang (2018) empirical studies, the Log (Sales) is among one of the most used proxies for 
company’s size, and it is considered to be a robust and significant measure.   
Debt/Assets: The total debt to total assets ratio, represents the percentage of a firm’s total debt 
in comparison to its total assets’ value. Debt level is often used as a financial risk measure. 
High leverage means that principal and interest payments will be reflected on a company’s cash 
flow statement, and have a direct impact on the firm’s financial performance. Fosberg and 
Ghosh (2006), use Debt/Assets as a capital structure proxy for US companies traded on the 
Amex and NYSE, when testing the relationship between a firm’s capital structure and its 
profitability levels.  
Net Income/Sales: The Net Income over Sales ratio measures the profitability level of a given 
firm. Profitability can influence the dividends’ amount a firm can distribute to its shareholders, 
and may influence the overall Gordon’s growth model performance. Consequentially, it is 
essential to create a variable (NI/Sales) capable of controlling the impact that different 
profitability levels might produce on the model stock price predictions. 
Stock’s Industry: Several studies including Michel (1979), Baker and Powell (1999) and Baker 
and Powell (2000) suggest that the industry in which a company operates, affects its dividend 
policy, and might generate a direct impact on a company’s stock price. Accordingly, the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) MSCI Structure, was used to divide stocks into their 
corresponding sectors (first two GICS’s digits – eleven sectors). Ten dummies were created, 
being the eleventh (Real Estate) the omitted one. The Global Industry Classification Standard 
is considered to be the primary classifier of a firm’s industry. Weiner studies (2005) classified 
the GICS scheme as being more reliable than the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, 
since fewer firms were changing its GICS’s code throughout the time. Additionally, Hrazdil 
and Zhang (2012), found that GICS-based measures presented a better proxy of the actual 
industry concentration, when compared to SICS-based measures.  
DPS/EPS: The dividend payout ratio measures the percentage of earnings per share that is 
being used to distribute dividends to a company’s equity holders. The ratio may reflect the 
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importance that current shareholders give to dividend payments, in detriment to the firm’s 
future investments. Since the overpricing variable represents a difference between the price of 
a model based on future dividend cash flows and the market stock price, the DPS/EPS ratio 
might indicate how the model accuracy varies between firms with different payout policies. 
DPS/P: The dividend yield represents the one-year dividend return on a stock investment. In 
other words, the ratio measures the percentage of dividend per share payments, in proportion 
to the price per share. The purpose is to analyze if a relationship between the dividend yield of 
a firm and the model predictions exist. Meaning, if firms with high dividend yields prove a 
more accurate estimation or vice-versa. 
Share Repurchases: This item represents the purchases of common and preferred stock 
(CRSP/Compustat Merged database), that according to Kahle, Dyl and Banyi study on 
measuring share repurchases (2005), is the most accurate measure available regarding a firms’ 
actual repurchases amount. For the purpose, a dummy variable was created. The value 1 was 
attributed to firms that engaged on annual repurchases (share repurchases > 0 US dollars; 2,205 
observations), and 0 to firms that did not verify any share repurchase activity throughout the 
entire year (share repurchases = 0 US dollars; 1,297 observations). According to several 
researchers (Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000; Skinner, 2008) and politics (Rubio, 
2019; Schumer and Sanders, 2019), share repurchase activities have been denoting a substantial 
growth in recent years, and this is one of the variables capable of influencing the Gordon’s 
growth model price predictions (which only takes dividend cash flows into account when 
valuing a stock). 
4. Overpricing analysis  
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
   2002-2006  2007-2010  2011-2018 
Mean  206.00  95.50  135.33 
Standard Error  25.63  12.52  13.28 
Median  -8.65  -19.10  -25.11 
Standard Dev  736.14  361.20  581.21 
Sample Variance  5 418.98  1 304.64  3 378.03 
Table 1 
Overpricing analysis, over a three-period range division (% values) 
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Table 1 provides the overpricing analysis among three different range periods. The first period 
defined from 2002 to 2006 (pre subprime crisis), the second from 2007 to 2010 (subprime crisis) 
and the third from 2011 to 2018 (post subprime crisis) – division explained on the “data and 
methodology” section 3.1. The main purpose was to identify potential deviations caused by the 
2007-2008 subprime crisis, as well as to safeguard that precedent and subsequent results were 
not being distorted by the crisis’ impact.  
Due to the methodology applied, the yearly sample will end up being different throughout the 
17-year period. For the first period range (2002-2006), the sample size account for 825 
observations, for the second (2007-2010), 832 observations and 1,915 for the post-crisis period. 
The average overpricing percentage during the pre-crisis period equaled 206.00%, which is 
higher than the average overpricing of the crisis period (95.50%), as well as the average of the 
post-crisis period (135.33%). Indeed, both mean and max overestimation results of the period 
preceding the subprime crisis, may reflect the model incapacity to predict the actual market 
stock price. On the contrary, it is possible to denote a lower difference between the price of the 
model (𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) and the market stock price (𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) during the 2007-2010 period, that is 
represented by the lower mean, min and max values. Such overpricing reduction was driven by 
the considerably lower annual values of the GGM stock price, during the crisis period (Evidence 
on Appendix A.1). Several companies were pressured to re-adapt their dividend payout policies 
to an entirely new situation, as the one verified on the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
However, when looking at the median values of all three-period ranges, the observed marks 
were negative (-8.65% in 2002-2006, -19.10 in 2007-2010 and -25.11 in 2011-2018). Those 
results may indicate that, despite the existence of some extreme positive overpricing values, 
where the price model tend to overshoot and completely miss the target, the majority of 
overpricing observations display negative percentages. The model might actually tend to 
undervalue the company’s stock price for a greater number of cases.  
Kurtosis  24.70  22.83  30.26 
Skewness  4.78  4.41  5.23 
MIN  -98.02  -96.88  -97.94 
MAX  4 954.65  2 438.67  4 232.05 
Count Observations  825  832  1 915 
Descriptive statistics on the Overpricing variable, divided into three different periods: pre-crisis (2002-2006), crisis (2007-2010) and post-
crisis (2011-2018). The mean, St. Error, median, St. Dev., Sample variance and min/max values are represented as percentage values. 
15 
 
Moreover, the Kurtosis, even though positive for all sub-set periods, is considerably lower 
during the crisis period. The performance of the average companies dropped because of the 
financial crisis, decreasing the overpricing mean, and flattering the distribution, when compared 
to the previous and following periods. 
The skewness, which indicates the level of non-symmetry over the periods observed, is higher 
for the post-crisis period. A value such as 5.23, indicates a more skewed distribution in the 
after-crisis period than in the pre-crisis or crisis periods. Nevertheless, results displayed an 
extended positive skewness for all three range periods analyzed. Furthermore, the standard 
deviation is relatively high during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, taking over 736.14% 
and 581.21% respectively. However, during the crisis, when the grand majority of the firms 
denoted a uniformed and generalized crash on its stock price, thus a lower discrepancy among 
prices, the standard deviation value fell to 361.20%. 
4.2 Year-Over-Year (YOY) mean evolution  
 
Through the analysis of Figure 1, it is possible to denote a significant decrease on the market 
stock price in 2008, where the latest verified its lowest value of $27.46. Such variation was 
somehow expected, since that period corresponds to the subprime crisis boom. However, the 
lower GGM price was only observed one period later in 2009. This minimum value was driven 
by the lowest DPS payment and a negative forecasted growth rate (Appendix A.2). After the 
Figure 1 





































Market stock price GGM price Overpricing
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Annual evolution of the market stock price, GGM price and overpricing mean values (winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile levels). Results are 
displayed over a 17-year period horizon, from 2002 to 2018. The market stock price (grey bar) and GGM stock price (yellow bar) are both 
expressed in US dollars amounts (left y-axis reference), while the overpricing evolution is presented through the black color line and expressed 
in percentage terms (right y-axis reference). Note: Full results displayed in Appendix A.1.  
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crisis boom, analysts were predicting a substantial decrease of the dividend payments (lower 
g), which were verified on the following years (2009 and 2010) through the actual DPS values. 
Besides, it is possible to observe on Appendix A.2, that the cost of equity noticed a considerable 
increase on the periods preceding the crisis (2005 and 2006), indicating that US companies 
were starting to raise equity at a higher cost and, at the same time, equity-investors were 
demanding superior returns on their investments, when compared to the previous periods of 
2003 or 2004. Such results revealed the cost of equity as a leading indicator, suggesting a 
general increase in the companies’ perceived risk even before the crisis arise. Subsequently, 
from 2009 to 2013, a growing trend was observed (Figure 1) on both the market stock price and 
the GGM stock price, while in 2014 and 2015, both values stabilized. From 2016 onwards, the 
GGM price started to decrease, reaching in 2018 values similar to the ones observed in 2011. 
On the contrary, the market stock price revealed a strong growth, achieving its maximum value 
of $51.27 in the year 2017.   
Regarding the overpricing evolution, it is possible to identify three different range periods, 
according to its growth curve trend. The first one until 2007, which includes the crisis period 
plus the year of 2007 (descending growth curve). The second from 2008 to 2015 (ascending 
growth curve) and the third from 2016 to 2018 (descending growth curve).    
Until 2007, there was a generalized decrease of the overpricing values (exception made to the 
year 2005, where the model estimation completely deviates from the target price). Such 
reduction was reached through the cumulative effect of a continuous increase on the market 
stock price and, at the same time, a descendant trend of the GGM stock price. On the second 
period-set (2008-2015), there was a positive evolution of the curve, that was substantiated by a 
more robust GGM stock price growth over the market stock price. While on the third period-
set (2016-2018), there was a decline of the overpricing curve, where the last 2018 value of 
53.84% reflects the mix between a moderated growth of the market stock price and a significant 
decrease of the GGM stock price. Moreover, some studies’ suggestions on the “dividends’ 
disappearance” do not seem to be confirmed in the analyzed period. The observed DPS 
payments have actually experienced an increase over (2016-2018] (Evidence on Appendix A.2 
– DPS rising), supporting the Gordon’s growth model as a valid valuation method.  
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4.3 Distribution by segments 
Figure 2 shows how all 3,572 overpricing results were distributed, according to the observed 
deviation of the price model from the actual market stock price. Those results were divided into 
six equally-sized segments of 100 percentual points each, plus one (> 500% segment) with the 
remaining observations, and the number of observations verified in every interval is displayed 
above the bars. A negative segment means that the GGM stock price estimation was below the 
corresponding market stock price (𝑃𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 < 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡), while a positive interval represents an 
overestimation of the GGM stock price when compared to the market stock price (𝑃𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 > 
𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡). 
Through the analysis of Figure 2, it is possible to verify that 57.7% of the observations belong 
to the (-100%, 0%] interval, and 76% are comprised between (-100% and 100%]. While the 
remaining 23.9% of observations were overestimations above 100%. 
Even though the aforementioned overpricing mean values (Figure 1 – YOY evolution) might 
suggest that the model tends to significantly overestimate the actual market stock price, actually 
more than fifty percent of the observed results represented a price underestimation (negative 
results). It became clear that the majority of pricing estimations were below the market stock 
Figure 2 
Overpricing distribution results, by equally-sized segments of 100 percentual points 
Distribution of the 3,572 overpricing results, over seven segments. All overpricing values, from the year of 2002 until 2018, were exhibited 
and presented according to their deviation from the market stock price. (Example: Segment (-100%, 0%] contains all values where the price 






price, which represents a surprising conclusion after a first analysis on the overpricing mean 
evolution.  
Looking deeper into the 76% of observations comprised between [-100%, 100%] (Appendix 
B.1), it is possible to denote the same trend observed on the overall sample (Figure 2). Indeed, 
most of the values are negative and comprised between the [-100%, -50%] interval. 
Additionally, there are only 6% of total observations (corresponding to 7.8% on the zoomed 
sample) within the [-10%, 10%] range, and 12.4% (corresponding to 16.3% on the zoomed 
sample) comprised between [-20%, 20%]. Those results might suggest the model incapacity to 
estimate the actual market stock price. Furthermore, Appendix B.2 shows that the overpricing 
distribution is similar across the three range periods analyzed (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis), 
with the (-100%, 0%] segment accounting for 52.7% of observations on the pre-crisis period, 
56.7% on the crisis, and 60.3% on the post-crisis. These results may indicate a growing 
underestimation pattern of the model, that became more prevalent on the post-crisis period 
(2011-2018), but that is verified across all analyzed periods (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis), 
regardless of the economic cycle. 
The following section will be dedicated to test several stocks’ characteristics that might be 
influencing the model accuracy. By identifying certain commonalities among stocks which 
performed better or worse under the Gordon’s growth model, it would be possible to make a 
more solid assessment regarding the “type of US stocks” that should or should not be valued 
through this method. 
5. Regression results  
5.1 Coefficients and statistically significance 
 
  Coefficients  SE  t Stat  p-value 
Intercept 0,49  0,62  0,79  0,43 
Log (Sales) -0,13  0,15  -0,87  0,38 
NI/Sales 1,62  0,68  2,39  0,02 
D/A -0,30  0,60  -0,50  0,61 
Table 2 
Regression results   
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Table 2 presents the coefficient, SE, t Stat and p-value results, observed from the multiple linear 
regression ran on the 3,502 observations (70 units’ sample reduction explained on the “data and 
methodology” section 3.2). The outcome provides a look at the statically significance (t Stat 
and p-value) of the independent variables selected, and their corresponding impact (beta 
coefficient) on the overpricing.  
Out of the tested variables, the profitability ratio (NI/Sales) and the dividend yield (DPS/P) 
were proven to be statistically significant at a 5% significance level, as well as some of the GIC 
Sectors (consumer discretionary, information technology and utilities). 
Both consumer discretionary and information technology sectors verified negative beta 
coefficients of -1.21 and -1.45, respectively, which means that those stocks tend to denote a 
lower overpricing value, ceteris paribus. While companies within the utility sector, display a 
positive relationship with the dependent variable (beta coefficient of 2.26), meaning that, 
everything else constant, the corresponding overpricing tend to be higher for those stocks.   
Also, the variable selected to control for different profitability levels (NI/Sales), denote a 
positive relationship with the dependent variable (beta coefficient of 1.62), which means that 
companies with higher profitability rates tend to present higher overpricing values. This may 
be related to the fact that firms with higher profitability levels, can engage into more ambitious 
Energy -0,03  0,54  -0,06  0,95 
Materials -0,91  0,49  -1,84  0,07 
Industrials -0,58  0,45  -1,30  0,19 
Consumer discretionary -1,21  0,48  -2,53  0,01 
Consumer staples 1,20  0,64  1,88  0,06 
Health care -0,83  0,56  -1,48  0,14 
Financials -0,71  0,42  -1,67  0,09 
Information technology -1,45  0,53  -2,75  0,01 
Communication services 0,08  0,73  0,11  0,92 
Utilities 2,26  0,53  4,24  0,00 
DPS/P 40,94  3,86  10,59  0,00 
DPS/EPS 0,00  0,01  0,05  0,96 
Share repurchase 0,24  0,21  1,15  0,25 
Beta coefficients, SE, t Stat and p-value values for all independent variables and interception of the regression model. All values are displayed 
in decimal terms, and the statically significant p-values (for a 5% significance level) are presented in a grey box. In addition, the regression 




dividend payments, leading to a possible inflation of the Gordon’s growth model predictions 
and consequentially increase the overpricing outcome. 
Regarding the explanatory variables purposed in the study (dividend payout ratio, dividend 
yield and share repurchase activity), only the dividend yield (DPS/P) was considered 
statistically significant. According to these results, neither the company’s dividend payout ratio 
nor it repurchase activity were considered significant to explain the difference in prices 
observed. This is a fundamental finding because it shows that both company’s payout principles 
(DPS/EPS) and annual share repurchase activity will not influence the accuracy of a valuation 
model that is purely based on discounted dividend cash flows (GGM). However, firms that 
engaged in share repurchase activities, do have a higher propensity to be undervalued (Evidence 
on Appendix C.2). 
On the other hand, the dividend yield displayed a statistically significance t-test result, with a 
very high beta coefficient of 40.94. Such result reveals that, previously observed 
overestimations, might be driven by higher dividend yield companies. As shown in Table 2, 
one-unit increase on the firm’s DPS/P ratio, lead to a substantial increase of 40.94 percentage 
points on the overpricing output.  
In addition, the regression output verified a R Squared value of 8.1%, an Adjusted R Squared 
of 7.7% and a statistically significant F-test of 19.15, meaning that the data provided sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the used regression model fits the data better than the one with no 
independent variables. 
The relationship between the dependent variable (overpricing) and the independent variables 
considered to be statistically significant (NI/Sales, GIC Sector and Dividend Yield) will be 
further analyzed in the following sections. The objective is to reach a more robust result 
regarding US stocks’ characteristics that could influence the accuracy of the model being tested.  
5.2 Dividend yield  
The dividend yield was the first variable analyzed, due to its higher impact on the overpricing 




Results displayed in figure 3, illustrate a positive relationship between a company’s dividend 
yield level and the corresponding overpricing value; an outcome that goes in line with the 
regression outcome. For the lowest dividend yield ratios (0% to 1%), underestimations are 
predominant, and the number of overestimations only start to rise afterwards. Moreover, 
overestimations are distributed within a very large overpricing interval, and high values are 
observed across almost all dividend yield levels. 
Subsequentially, it will be important to look deeper on the most accurate overpricing 
observations, in order to understand if those tend to follow any specific pattern regarding their 
DPS/P ratio. For the purpose, observations comprised within the [-20%, 20%] overpricing 
interval will be isolated and further analyzed according to their respective dividend yield level. 
Figure 4 was created with the objective of better understanding how most accurate overpricing 
results are distributed across different dividend yield levels. Observations comprised within the 
[-20%, 20%] overpricing interval represent 12.7% (or 444 observations) of the total results.  
Out of this sub-sample, there were 39% overestimations against 61% underestimations, with 
only one observation matching the exact 0.0% overpricing value. When comparing these values 
with the total overpricing distribution, it is possible to verify that those, tend to follow the 
overall sample pattern (42% overestimations vs 58% underestimations).  
Figure 3 


























Overpricing observations distributed across different dividend yield levels. The y-axis expresses the overpricing results in percentual terms 
from -100% to 400%, while the x-axis represents the dividend yield ratios from 0% to 20%. For a better comprehension of the figure, only 
90% of the overpricing results are being displayed, while the total distribution is exhibited on appendix C3, figure C3.1. 
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Furthermore, when looking to figure 4 results, we may argue that the dividend yield variable is 
not able to regulate the Gordon’s growth model accuracy. Despite being the most impactful 
variable of the regression model (beta coefficient equal to 40.94), there is no specific dividend 
yield interval that ensures a more accurate overpricing outcome. Overpricing values are 
displayed across several different dividend yield ratios, and do not seem to follow any explicit 
pattern. 
5.3 Profitability  
Figure 4 
Zoom-in on the [-20%, 20%] overpricing interval, displayed across different dividend yield levels 
Figure 5 

















































Overpricing observations comprised within the [-20%, 20%] interval. The y-axis expresses the overpricing results in percentual terms, while 
the x-axis represents the dividend yield ratios from 0% to 20%.  
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Figure 5 shows the distribution of the overpricing variable across different stocks’ profitability 
levels. Observations tend to follow an upward movement approximately until the 10/15% 
profitability level, followed by a downward trend from thereon. Moreover, despite being mainly 
predominant on the [0%, 40%] profitability interval, high overestimation values, are also 
observed across all other profitability levels.  
Following the same approach as before, most accurate overpricing results will be examined 
across different profitability ratios. The objective is to realize if those observations tend to 
follow any specific pattern regarding their NI/Sales ratio. Accordingly, observations comprised 
within the [-20%, 20%] overpricing interval will be isolated and further analyzed according to 
their respective profitability level. 
Figure 6 shows how the 444 most accurate overpricing observations are distributed across 
different profitability levels. Those observations comprised within the [-20%, 20%] overpricing 
interval represent 12.7% of the total results, and most accurate results tend to follow the same 
overestimation/underestimation pattern as the overall sample (39/61% vs 42/58%, 
respectively).  
Figure 6 
Zoom-in on the [-20%, 20%] overpricing interval, displayed across different profitability levels 
Overpricing observations distributed across different profitability levels. The y-axis expresses the overpricing results in percentual terms from 
-100% to 400%, while the x-axis represents the NI/Sales ratios from -40% to 100%. For a better comprehension of the figure, only 90% of the 
























Overpricing observations comprised within the [-20%, 20%] interval. The y-axis expresses the overpricing results in percentual terms, while 
the x-axis represents the profitability ratios from -40% to 100%.  
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When analyzing figure 6 results, the same outcome is observed. The variable being tested 
(NI/Sales), does not regulate Gordon’s growth model accuracy. Meaning, there is no particular 
profitability interval capable of ensuring a more accurate overpricing outcome.  
Overpricing values are distributed across several different profitability ratios, and do not seem 
to follow any explicit pattern. 
5.4 GIC Sector  
Overpricing results were also analyzed across statistically significant GIC Sectors (information 
technology, consumer discretionary and utility sectors). Figure 7 presents the overpricing 
distribution among information technology stocks (238 observations), Figure 8 displays results 
for the consumer discretionary stocks (356 observations), while Figure 9 exhibits results for the 







































Overpricing distribution for the information technology and consumer discretionary sectors 
displays similar results. On both cases, a generalized underestimation tendency between [-50%, 
-100%] is observed (67% of the observations on the information technology sector and 60% on 
the consumer discretionary sector, Evidence on Appendix C.4). In addition, there are only 
sporadic overestimations, particularly for the information technology stocks. 
Figure 9 
Utility stocks – overpricing observations 
Figure 8 
























Overpricing observations across different significant GIC Sectors. Figure 7 – information technology stocks; Figure 8 – consumer discretionary 



























On the contrary, when looking at the overpricing distribution across utility stocks, a completely 
different result was observed. US utility stocks did not denote any underestimation propensity. 
In fact, overestimations accounted for 80% of the total observations (Evidence on Appendix 
C.4). Results were widely dispersed among all positive overpricing segments, and there was no 
specific pattern regarding their value distribution. Accordingly, results displayed in Figure 9, 
suggest that the GGM is a valuation model that tend to significantly overvalue US utility stocks. 
Furthermore, when these three statistically significant GIC Sectors are compared with all other 
sectors, some similarities are denoted. 
Utility and real estate were the only sectors exhibiting a clear GGM overestimation propensity, 
although for different reasons. Utility stocks because of its lowest cost of equity mean (3.4%, 
against an average ke of 5.9%). On average, utility companies raise equity at a lower cost, when 
compared with companies operating in different sectors.  
Whereas real estate stocks verified the highest DPS payment mean (1.76, against an average 
DPS of 1.15) meaning that, on average, real estate companies tend to engage in superior 



















Com. services 16,3% 61% 39% 1,27 0,4% 6,5% 6,2% 
C. discretionary 7,6% 81% 19% 0,88 0,7% 7,2% 6,5% 
C. staples 13,6% 53% 47% 1,21 0,9% 4,8% 3,9% 
Energy 11,8% 60% 40% 1,68 -0,3% 5,6% 5,9% 
Financials 16% 51% 49% 1,01 0,7% 5,3% 4,6% 
Health care 7% 70% 30% 1,04 -0,1% 5,1% 5,3% 
Industrials 12,7% 71% 29% 0,98 1,3% 6,5% 5,2% 
Inf. technology 9,2% 83% 17% 0,79 1,3% 9,1% 7,9% 
Materials 9,6% 74% 26% 0,96 0,6% 6,4% 5,8% 
Real estate 18% 36% 64% 1,76 0,7% 5,1% 4,4% 
Utilities 11,3% 20% 80% 1,45 0,6% 3,4% 2,8% 
Average 12,1% 60% 40% 1,15 0,7% 5,9% 5,3% 
Table 3 presents the overpricing tendency (Underestimations vs Overestimations) and accuracy ([-20%, +20%] overpricing interval) across 
GIC Sectors, as well as the mean values of the variables used to compute the GGM price (DPS, g and ke). All variables are expressed in 
percentage terms (%), except for the mean DPS that is expressed in US dollar amounts ($). 
Table 3 
GGM variables and overpricing analysis, across GIC Sectors 
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Moreover, financial and consumer staple’s stocks were the ones that evidenced a more balanced 
overestimations/underestimations ratio (51/49% and 53/47%, respectively). However, this 
equilibrium is not substantially translated into more accurate overpricing results (Evidence on 
Table 3, [-20%, +20%] column).  
For all other sectors, a strong underestimation tendency is denoted. Both consumer 
discretionary and information technology (two significant GIC Sectors) proved to be the most 
underestimated sectors (but not the most accurate ones), especially due to lower DPS payments 
and higher ke rates.  
In general, the model’s lack of accuracy was corroborated across different GIC Sectors. There 
was no particular GIC Sector more susceptible to be accurately priced, according to the 
Gordon’s growth model valuation method. As a matter of fact, the percentage of observations 
comprised within the [-20%, +20%] most accurate overpricing interval, represent a minority in 
relation to the total number of observations (minimum: 7%; maximum: 18%; and an average 
value of 12.1%). 
6. Conclusion   
Even though the Gordon’s growth model accuracy was tested for several markets, including the 
Ghana SE, Nairobi SE, Bombay SE and Macedonian SE, there is no empirical evidence of the 
Gordon’s growth model accuracy in predicting US stock prices. This research tested the model 
accuracy on a broader and larger stocks’ sample (NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq).  
This study showed that the average DPS payments have actually increased 70% throughout the 
analyzed period (from $0.91 in 2002 to $1.55 in 2018), contradicting Fama and French (2001) 
“dividends disappearing” prediction in the 21st century. However, it would be important to 
further explore if this increase is being pushed by the DPS payments rise in some particular US 
companies, or if otherwise, this DPS payments increase is a common trend throughout the US 
stock market.   
Regarding the overpricing test, a systematic and growing GGM underestimation tendency was 
denoted across different economic cycles (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods). More than 
half of the overpricing results were comprised within the [-100%, 0%] negative segment, in all 
three period-range settled. Representing 52.6% of the total pre subprime crisis observations, 
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56.7% of the subprime crisis observations, and 60.3% of the post subprime crisis observations. 
Overall results (including all three periods’ observations) followed the same pattern, 58% 
underestimations against 42% overestimations, with 8% of the total observations being 
considerably high overestimations superior to 500%. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to denote that this research assumes the CAPM model in order to 
compute the cost of equity (ke), and analysts’ forecasts on future DPS payments to compute the 
DPS growth rate (g), which might represent a potential limitation. In addition, it would be 
important to test the Gordon’s growth model sensitivity under different ke and g calculation 
techniques. 
The multiple linear regression applied, denoted that the dividend yield ratio, the profitability 
level and some GIC Sectors (information technology, consumer discretionary and utilities) 
were considered statistically significant variables. Share repurchases and dividend payout ratios 
did not prove to be significant variables. Although firms that engage in share repurchase 
activities do have a higher propensity to be undervalued according to the Gordon’s growth 
model.  
Besides, neither the dividend yield nor profitability level were able to control Gordon’s growth 
model accuracy, meaning, there was no particular dividend yield or profitability range capable 
of guaranteeing an overpricing outcome closer to 0%. When observing most accurate 
overpricing results (between -20% and +20%) across different dividend yield ratios (variable 
with the highest beta coefficient of 40.94), it was possible to confirm that overpricing 
observations were displayed across several dividend yield levels, and there were only some 
couple of observations with an overpricing matching the 0% outcome. 
While for the GIC Sector analysis, it was possible to identify particular sectors with a higher 
propensity to be either under or overvalued. However, overpricing results close to 0% were 
always a minority in relation to the total number of observations.  
Both information technology and consumer discretionary sectors denoted a clear 
underestimation tendency (83% and 81% of the total observations, respectively), driven by 
lower DPS payments and higher cost of equity rates (mean values). On the other hand, utility 
and real estate sectors proved to be the ones with the highest overestimation tendency (80% and 
64% of the total observations, respectively), although for different reasons. On average, utility 
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companies raised equity at a lower cost, when compared with companies operating in different 
sectors, whereas real estate companies paid the highest DPS (ceteris paribus).  
Altogether, research findings suggest that the Gordon’s growth model is not an accurate tool to 
value US companies. Despite being possible to identify specific underestimation or 
overestimation patterns across stocks, the model is not able to deliver accurate overpricing 
results. Consequently, this valuation method, should be considered of questionable use for 
future valuation practices and investment decisions. 
Moreover, this paper represents an important empirical contribution to the US stocks’ valuation 
field, because it creates a fundamental alert that should be taken into account by all investors 












A GGM stock price (P model) and market stock price (P market) 
impact on the overpricing variable   
A.1 Mean evolution and Year-Over-Year (YOY) variations  
Year P market (US $) 
   P market, 
YOY variation 
(%) P model (US $) 
      P model, 
YOY variation 
(%) Overpricing (%) 
2002 22.74   83.36   266.60 
2003 28.77 26.5 90.10 8.1 213.20 
2004 32.17 11.8 81.22 -9.9 152.45 
2005 32.97 2.5 111.96 37.9 239.60 
2006 37.09 12.5 68.69 -38.7 85.18 
2007 37.67 1.6 56.08 -18.4 48.86 
2008 27.46 -27.1 76.89 37.1 180.04 
2009 28.27 3.0 54.98 -28.5 94.48 
2010 33.88 19.8 69.57 26.5 105.37 
2011 33.10 -2.3 73.21 5.2 121.16 
2012 35.91 8.5 86.76 18.5 141.61 
2013 43.48 21.1 120.42 38.8 176.99 
2014 42.35 -2.6 109.11 -9.4 157.63 
2015 41.46 -2.1 111.32 2.0 168.49 
2016 47.43 14.4 97.45 -12.5 105.45 
2017 51.27 8.1 92.68 -4.9 80.76 
2018 48.57 -5.3 74.73 -19.4 53.84 
Table A1 reports the mean evolution of the price calculated through the Gordon’s growth model 
(𝑃𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙), as well as the market stock price (𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡), and the percentual YOY variations of 
both prices. The overpricing computation was presented in the last column of Table A1, in order 
to follow the impact that both drivers’ variations (𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 and 𝑃𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) were causing on the 
variable evolution.  
Results displayed on Table A1, illustrates the stock market overconfidence on the periods 
preceding the subprime crisis, with the maximum mean of the 2002-2006 period-set being 
observed in the year of 2006 (𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 2006). Additionally, it is possible to verify substantial 
lower 𝑃𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 values during the second period-set (2007-2010), where companies were forced 
to re-adapt their dividend payout policies to the 2007-2008 financial crisis’ unstable reality.   
Table A1 
YOY variation of the P market, P model and overpricing annual mean values 
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A.2 Mean evolution of the GGM stock price variables  
Table A2 reports the mean evolution of the 𝑃𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 components: DPS, g and ke. The DPS 
variable is expressed in US dollars amount and corresponds to the annual dividend per share 
amount. The g variable equals the annual dividend’s growth rate and the ke corresponds to the 
annual cost of equity (both mean values are expressed in percentage terms). Table 2 results 
express the different annual factors influencing overpricing values (DPS and Ke-g), as well as 
their YOY and overall impact on the GGM stock price evolution (last column).  
Lower overpricing values during the crisis, were explained by the mix of two factors: the 
significant rise of the differential coefficient (ke-g), which started in the year of 2005 and 
reached its maximum value of 6.05% in 2007 (only surpassed afterwards in the year of 2018), 
and the very low mean values of DPS payments in the years of 2009 and 2010 (second-half of 
the considered crisis period). This last factor may reflect the dividend payout policies re-
adjustments that were felt right after the crisis boom. 
 
Year 






g Ke Ke-g 
(Ke-g) YOY 
 variation  
(%) 
2002 0.91  0.93 4.72 3.79  
2003 0.96 5.8 0.11 3.68 3.57 -5.8 
2004 1.09 13.2 0.26 3.77 3.50 -1.8 
2005 1.01 -7.3 1.45 5.65 4.20 19.7 
2006 1.04 3.5 1.93 7.61 5.67 35.2 
2007 1.06 2.0 1.68 7.73 6.05 6.6 
2008 1.07 0.9 0.57 6.51 5.94 -1.8 
2009 0.95 -11.9 -0.69 3.84 4.53 -23.7 
2010 0.98 3.7 0.25 4.62 4.37 -3.5 
2011 1.12 13.9 -0.04 5.18 5.22 19.2 
2012 1.15 3.0 0.20 5.18 4.97 -4.6 
2013 1.09 -5.4 -0.14 4.46 4.60 -7.5 
2014 1.19 8.8 0.42 5.43 5.00 8.7 
2015 1.33 12.4 0.79 6.34 5.55 10.9 
2016 1.18 -11.8 0.59 6.23 5.65 1.8 
2017 1.32 12.1 0.84 6.23 5.40 -4.5 
2018 1.55 17.8 1.71 7.97 6.26 16.0 
        
Table A2 
Analysis of the P model factors – YOY mean values evolution  
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B Overpricing distribution 
B.1 Zoom-in on the overpricing distribution    
 
 
Figure B1 presents the overpricing distribution values on the [-100%, 100%] interval. The same 
was divided into four groups of 50 percentual points each: lower than 50%, between -50 and 
0%, from 0 (excluded) to 50% and above 50%.  
Results show that 75.9% of the zoomed sample exhibit negative values. Moreover, 48.5% 
(almost half of this sub-sample) represent negative deviations below -50% [-100%, -50%], and 
only 42,2% of the results are comprised within the [-50%, 50%] interval closest to 0%. Indeed, 
the majority of the results are concentrated on the left side of the distribution, and the number 
of observations tends to follow the same descending curve of the overall sample. 
Furthermore, there are only 7.8% of values verified withing the [-10%, 10%] interval and 16.3% 
between [-20%, 20%]. Such results might reveal the model inefficiency in estimating the actual 




Distribution of overpricing results, over the [-100%, 100%] interval 





B.2 Overpricing distribution on the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods 
Figure B2.1 
Pre-crisis period: 825 observations 
Figure B2.2 
Crisis period: 832 observations 
Figure B2.3 
Post-crisis period: 1915 observations 
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C Regression analysis   

















        
Log (Sales) -0,05 1,00 
       
NI/Sales 0,07 -0,28 1,00 
      
D/A 0,00 -0,03 0,03 1,00 
     
Energy 0,02 0,15 -0,08 0,05 1,00 
    
Materials -0,05 0,11 -0,10 0,08 -0,08 1,00 
   
Industrials -0,05 0,09 -0,12 0,07 -0,10 -0,12 1,00 
  
C. Discret. -0,08 0,11 -0,13 0,05 -0,09 -0,10 -0,13 1,00 
 
C. Staples 0,04 0,12 -0,03 0,07 -0,05 -0,06 -0,07 -0,06 1,00 
Health Care -0,04 0,13 -0,01 -0,02 -0,06 -0,07 -0,09 -0,08 -0,04 
Financials 0,00 -0,29 0,21 -0,32 -0,14 -0,17 -0,22 -0,19 -0,11 
Inf. Tech. -0,07 0,07 -0,01 -0,06 -0,07 -0,08 -0,11 -0,09 -0,05 
Com. Services 0,02 0,08 -0,02 0,07 -0,04 -0,05 -0,06 -0,05 -0,03 
Utilities 0,17 0,03 -0,09 -0,28 -0,08 -0,10 -0,13 -0,11 -0,06 
DPS/P 0,23 -0,14 0,13 0,15 0,10 -0,09 -0,15 -0,11 -0,02 
DPS/EPS 0,01 -0,04 0,04 0,06 -0,05 0,01 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 


















        
Log (Sales) 
        
NI/Sales 
        
D/A 
        
Energy 
        
Materials 
        
Industrials 
        
C. Discret. 
        
C. Staples 
        
Health Care 1,00 
       
Financials -0,13 1,00 
      
Inf. Tech. -0,06 -0,15 1,00 
     
Com. Services -0,04 -0,09 -0,04 1,00 
    
Utilities -0,07 -0,18 -0,09 -0,05 1,00 
   
DPS/P -0,09 0,07 -0,10 0,04 0,17 1,00 
  
DPS/EPS -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,01 0,04 1,00 
 
Share Rep.  -0,01 0,04 0,08 0,04 -0,22 -0,16 -0,03 1,00 
Table C1 
Correlation coefficients of the regression variables 
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C.2 Overpricing distribution: companies that engaged in share repurchase 







Distribution of overpricing results - stocks with share repurchase activity 
Figure C2.2 





C.3 Overpricing observations per dividend yield and profitability levels  
Figure C3.1 presents overpricing total observations across stocks’ dividend yield ratios 
(DPS/P). Overpricing results are mostly concentrated within the [0%, 15%] dividend yield 
interval.  
Figure C3.2 presents overpricing total observations across stocks’ profitability ratios 






























Total overpricing distribution, comprised across different dividend yield ratios  
Figure C3.2 




























C.4 Overpricing distribution per significant GIC Sectors  
Figure C4.1 
Information technology stocks – overpricing distribution 
Figure C4.2 
Consumer discretionary stocks – overpricing distribution 
Figure C4.3 
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